Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here.

We’ve been talking about this big problem,

mostly in terms of the direct effect of a North Korean attack or action

against someone else. I’d like to ask you to help us understand,

in a little different context this morning, the long-term effect

of nuclear arms in North Korea on all of Asia. I mean, some of it,

I suppose, is obvious.

What does North Korea have to do to cause Japan to change its

attitude about nuclear weapons, for example? And if Japan were

then to change its attitude about nuclear weapons, most of us can

imagine how the rest of Asia might feel, and then China would

take, possibly, further steps. There would be increased pressure on

the United States in connection with Taiwan. You mentioned Taiwan

a little earlier.

So it seems to me that this big problem that we’re talking about

is perhaps not as big a problem as the long-term possibility of a

domino game that would turn into an Asian arms race. And how

are you evaluating that as you think about how to deal with this

big problem?

In the same kind of domino-game connection,

we haven’t talked this morning about our troops in South

Korea. And how does the big problem in North Korea affect the

long-term planning of the American presence in South Korea? Because

what happens there seems to make more difference in other

countries than it might make in Korea itself.

Very quickly, you’ve mentioned anti-Americanism.

As we look at South Korea and that phenomenon and Europe

in connection with Iraq today, do you see any echoes of Europe

in the early 1980s as we put nuclear-tipped weapons there

and the intense anti-American feeling that seemed to develop there

because of our forwardness in facing a threat?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.